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the United States Supreme Court could never validly hear a Lackey
claim, because it would be announcing a "new rule," which is prohibited by Teague. The only way out of the Teague box, therefore, is if a
Lackey claim falls under a Teague exception or Teague does not apply
at all.
The most likely Teague exception to apply is the first one, which
allows retroactive application of a new rule if the new rule prohibits "a
certain category ofpunishment for a class of defendants because oftheir
status or offense." ' 29 Since a Lackey claim effectively argues that the
state no longer has the power to punish a defendant, the claim should
30
come under this exception.
The other way around Teague is to argue, as some lower courts
have held, that Teague by its nature is inapplicable to a Lackey claim.

For example, in McKenzie v. Day, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that Teague should not apply to Lackey claims as they "cannot
normally be raised on direct appeal because much of the delay complained of arises in post-conviction proceedings." 3 1 Defense counsel,
therefore should argue not only that Lackey claims fall under a Teague
exception, but also that Teague does not apply at all.

29 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
30 The second exception, the "watershed" exception, allows
retroactivity for"those new procedures without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Teague, 489 U.S. at
311, 313. Since Lackey claims involve a substantive constitutional

claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment, rather than a claim of
procedural error, it is difficult to see how courts would allow this second
exception to apply.
31 57 F.3d 1461, 1468 n.15 (1991).

Willie Lloyd Turner was executed on May 25, 1995.
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond

TOWNES v. MURRAY
68 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Richard Townes shot Virginia Goebel, the night clerk at a Virginia
Beach Majik Market, sometime during the early morning hours of April
14, 1985. Goebel's body was discovered face down in a pool of blood.
Townes was indicted for capital murder during the commission of a
robbery or attempted robbery. The Commonwealth's primary evidence
consisted of empty casings found next to the body that matched a gun
owned by Townes, a customer's identification of Townes as being in the
store just hours before the killing, and a fellow inmate's statement that
Townes had confessed to shooting Goebel.t
After a public defender withdrew and two new counsel were
appointed, Townes petitioned to dismiss counsel and made a motion to
proceed pro se. The court granted the motion. At trial, the jury returned
a guilty verdict, and then, after finding future dangerousness, the jury
2
sentenced Townes to death.

I Townes v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 843 (4th Cir. 1995).
2 Id. at 843-44.
3 Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307,362 S.E.2d 650 (1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988).
4 Townes v. Murray, 502 U.S. 912 (1991).
5 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994).
6 Townes, 68 F.3d at 845, 847.
7 Id. at 853. A patron of the Majik Market, Dorothy Moore, had
identified Townes and one other man from a photo array of six snapshots.
Later, she identified Townes from a five-man lineup. He was the only
man who also appeared in the photo array. Townes argued that his being

The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the conviction and sentence
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 Townes' state
habeas petition was denied by the trial court and subsequently refused by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. The United States Supreme Court again
4
denied certiorari.
Townes filed a federal habeas petition, raising three major areas of
alleged error. First, Townes asserted that the trial court erred in that it
failed to conduct an adequate Farettahearing pre-trial, that it failed to
conduct an additional Farettahearing after trial but prior to the sentencing hearing, and that he was incompetent to "stand trial" during the
sentencing phase. Second, Townes argued that the trial court violated
Simmons v. South Carolina5 when it refused to instruct the jury as to
Townes' parole ineligibility if sentenced to life imprisonment. 6 Third,
Townes raised challenges to the finding of guilt, alleging unduly sugges7
tive identification procedures and Brady violations, among others.

the only constant between the photo array and the lineup "unreasonably
and impermissibly" indicated to Moore that he had committed the
murder. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that there was no "flat prohibition"
against making Townes the one constant in the array and the lineup. Id.
The court concluded that because no constitutional infirmity lay in the
lineup itself and in light of the "favorable conditions" under which Moore
saw Townes, the district court was within its discretion to dismiss this
claim. Id. at 853-54. The court's rulings on Townes' remaining claims
will not be discussed in this note. These include (1) a second identification (2) an alleged Brady violation and (3) a claim that the magistrate
judge should have recused himself. Id. at 854-55.
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A magistrate conducted an evidentiary hearing on Townes' incompetency to stand trial and the Brady claims. Following the hearing, the
magistrate recommended that all claims be dismissed. The distict court,
adopting the magistrate's report, dismissed the petition.Townes 8appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit held that Townes' Faretta claims were
procedurally defaulted 9 and that Teague v. Lane10 barred his Simmons
claims.11
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

Simmons v. South Carolina:Who Must Raise Parole
Eligibility?
A. The Need for a Defendant to Request a Simmons Instruction

At sentencing, in the process of its deliberations, Townes' jury
asked for an instruction from the court on what kind of parole eligibility
attached to a life sentence. Thecourtreplied thatparole eligibility was not
an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in sentencing Townes. After
dismissing thejury, the court asked if either party had an objection to this
reply. Neither did. In his appeal, Townes argued that under Simmons v.
South Carolina,the court's refusal to inform the jury about his parole
eligibility violated his right to due process. 12 In Simmons, the United
States Supreme Court had held that a defendant must be allowed to
13
inform a jury that he is ineligible for parole.
The Fourth Circuit ruled, however, that Simmons' holding was too
narrow to encompass Townes' claim and, therefore, Townes was arguing
for a new rule barred by Teague. 14 The court concluded that Simmons
does not require that parole ineligibility information come from the
judge, but only requires that a defendant be given the opportunity to
presentparole ineligibility information. BecauseTownes could have told
the jury he was parole ineligible in closing argument, in the Fourth
Circuit's view, no constitutional violation under Simmons occurred. Due
process is violated only when the defendant is prevented from informing
the jury of his parole ineligibility either through a jury instruction or a
direct argument to the jury. 15 Thus Simmons, according to the Fourth
Circuit, is not self-executing and defense counsel must raise the issue
at the earliest possible moment and keep raising it in order to avoid
procedural default.

8 Id. at 844-45.
9 Id. at 847-48.
10 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
11 Townes, 68 F.3d at 848.
12 Id. at 847.
13 114 S.Ct.at 2196.
14 Townes, 68 F.3d at 851-53.
15 Id. at 849-50.
16 Id. at 851.
concurring).
17 Simmons, 114 S.Ct.at 2198 (Souter,J.,
18 Id.
19 Townes, 68 F.3d at 852.
20 These decisions include: Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638
n.13 (1980)(stating that "'the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
inspite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty .. is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and

B. The Denial of Simmons Instruction As Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
In addition to arguing that due process placed an affirmative duty
on the judge to give aparole ineligibility instruction, Townes also argued
that such a duty was compelled by the Eighth Amendment. The Fourth
Circuit did concede that his argument was supported by Justice Souter's
concurrence in Simmons. 16 Justice Souter asserted that in all capital
cases, even if the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the
Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on courts to instruct juries on the
meaning oflife imprisonment. The Eighth Amendment requires such an
instruction, explained Justice Souter, because of an inherent need for
heightened reliability in a jury's decision that death is the appropriate
sentence. 17 Knowledge that the defendant is ineligible for parole would,
according to Justice Souter, make the jury's death sentence more reliable. 18 Despite its willingness to entertain Townes' claim, the Fourth
Circuit ultimately rejected this argument.
As it did with the due process claim, the court decided that even if
the Eighth Amendment imposed an affirnative duty to give a jury
19
instruction, it would be a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane. The court
noted the tension between the United States Supreme Court's pre-1988
decisions that struck down certain procedures because they rendered a
death sentence unreliable 20 and the Court's decision in California v.
Ramos 21 which had concluded that the states should be given leeway in
deciding whether sentencers could consider matters such as commutation and parole. The court determined that this ambiguity, which existed
at the time Townes' conviction became final, meant that the rule sought
22
by Townes was a new rule not "'compelled by existing precedent.'
Thus, Townes could not benefit from it unless it fell within one of the two
exceptions to Teague.23
Townes' claim clearly did not fall within the first Teague exception-that it "place[d] certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe."' 24 The Fourth Circuit also concluded that it could not find that
25
Townes' "rule" comprised a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure
under the second Teague exception, noting that it believed that a majority
of the United States Supreme Court would not recognize such a right in
'26
the first place, let alone view it as a "watershed rule."
In summary, the Fourth Circuit read Simmons narrowly as not
imposing an affirmative duty on courts to instruct a jury as to what life
imprisonment means, even where the jury requests clarification. It
appears that the Fourth Circuit will find Simmons applicable only in cases
where a defendant has been completely precluded from getting parole

Fourteenth Amendments"' (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,605
(1978)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v.North
Carolina,428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that because death is a
qualitatively different punishment, there is a need for a correlative
"reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment
in a specific case").
21 463 U.S. 992, 997-1009 (1983) (holding that the Federal
Constitution does notbarstate courts from informing a capital sentencing
jury that the Governor may commute a life sentence without parole).
22 Townes, 68 F.3d at 852 (quoting Saffle v. Parks,494 U.S. 484,
488 (1990)).
23 Id.
24 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States,401
U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
25 Id. at 311.
26 Townes, 68 F.3d at 852-53.
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ineligibility before the sentencing jury. Thus, the burden is on defense
counsel to raise the issue to avoid procedural default.
C. The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of Simmons v. South
CarolinaIs Dicta

In his concurrence, Judge Luttig faulted the majority for ignoring
the mandate of Teague v. Lane27 because they addressed the merits of
Townes' Simmons claim without first deciding if Simmons announced a
new rule. If Simmons did announce anew rule, that would end the inquiry
altogether by making the ruling unavailable to Townes, whatever its
scope, since his case was already on habeas. 28 Instead, the majority's
first step was to analyze whether Simmons' holding was too narrow to
benefit Townes, which meant that the court had to actually decide the
merits ofTownes' claim underSimmons. As the concurrencepointed out,
because the court later found Simmons itself to be a new rule, its earlier
discussion of Simmons' scope is dicta unnecessary to resolving Townes'
claims.29 All of the court's statements interpreting Simmons' scope,
therefore, are not binding. Nonetheless, the opinion is a strong indication
that the Fourth Circuit will not be receptive to Townes' argument that
Simmons places an affirmative duty on courts to instruct juries about a
defendant's parole ineligibility where the defendant does not request an
instruction.
I.

Farettaand the Capital Sentencing Phase: An Independent
Requirement?

In addition to his Simmons claims, Townes argued that his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated when, after his conviction but before
his sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to conduct both anewFaretta
hearing and, sua sponte, a competency hearing. Townes' first theory was
that the Sixth Amendment conferred a general right to a new or renewed
Farettahearing before the sentencing phase. Second, Townes alleged
that he experienced a sudden loss of mental capacity after hearing the
guilty verdict which required both a new Faretta inquiry and a pre30
sentencing phase competency determination.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that these claims were procedurally
defaulted because Townes failed to present them fairly either on direct
appeal at the state level or on state habeas. 31 Nonetheless, they were not
without merit. The fact that a capital sentencing proceeding is a bewil-

27 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague held that where a United States
Supreme Court ruling established a "new rule," a rule that could not be
predicted by existing precedent, that rule could not be applied retroactively to a conviction which is already final.
28 Townes, 68 F.3d at 855-56.
29 Id. at 856.
30 Id. at 845.
31 Id. at 846.

dering undertaking for experienced attorneys alone suggests a special
Farettainquiry is necessary, but the point is made even more emphatic
by the court's lengthy discussion ofthe complexities ofTownes'Simmons
claims. Townes clearly was completely unaware of the arguments
afforded by Simmons or the related body of law that would suggest he had
an Eighth Amendment right for the judge to give the jury a meaningful
definition of life imprisonment.
Similarly, Townes' argument that the court should have held a
competency hearing after the guilty verdict and prior to the sentencing
hearing was not want of merit. In Dropev. Missouri,32 the United States
Supreme Court stated that ajudge has a sua sponte duty to suspend a trial
and conduct an evaluation of a defendant's competency when changed
circumstances call the defendant's competency into question.33 Since a
lack of competency places a defendant beyond the power of a state to
prosecute, courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that defendants are
not "tried or convicted" while incompetent. A failure to meet this duty
results in a violation of the defendant's due process rights. 34 In Townes'
case, if he were, as he claimed, so devastated by the guilty verdict that he
became incompetent, the reasoning in Dropesuggests that the court had
a constitutional duty to suspend his sentencing until after it conducted a
competency evaluation.
Moreover,Townes' competency argument also supports his claim
that he was entitled to a new Farettahearing. If a defendant is or becomes
incompetent, then he does not possess "arational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."'35 Itfollows that incompetency makes it impossible for a defendant to proceed pro se under
Faretta because without an understanding of the proceedings against
him, he no longercan be seen as making a knowing and intelligent waiver
of his right to counsel. Thus, where a defendant manifests signs of
incompetence during aproceeding, Drope and Farettarequire a court to
suspend the trial, to conduct a competency evaluation, and if the
defendant isproceeding pro se, to hold a new Farettahearing. Had his
Farettaclaims not been procedurally defaulted, Townes would have had
the opportunity to make these arguments. Thus, defense counsel are
reminded of the importance of raising all claims, both generally and
specifically, at the first opportunity to do so because the ripple effects of
failing to do so are grave.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade

32 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
33 Id. at 181.
34 Id. at 171-72.
35 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

